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High modernism, the dominant sociotechnical imagination in post-war Taiwan, 
manifested itself in tacit answers to the questions of what a better society would 
look like, and the most pragmatic and viable approach to make the particular 
dreamed-of future become reality. This paper explores the exclusion of alternative 
energy futures brought about by a high modernist imaginary. This imaginary 
underlies a strategy of emphasizing shortage at present and prosperity in the future
－as long as the current shortage is solved in a reliable way. Focusing on the 
contention over energy supply between 2011 and 2015, this paper provides an 
analysis of how power shortage is presented in discursive ambiguity, how the 
claimed crisis over electricity shortage moves to the centre of public debate via the 
institutional practices of power rationing, and how its public authority is established 
through collective witness. Renewable energy is continually represented as an 
‘immature’ and ‘unviable’ technology when it comes to satisfying the nation’s need, 
through particular routinised practices in the calculation of ‘reserve margins’ in 
electricity planning and the collective witnessing of (limited) ‘operating reserves’. We 
argue that both of these come with their own assumptions and political implications 
and, therefore, invite scrutiny.  



















The Fukushima nuclear disaster caused by the earthquake in March 2011 triggered 
an outcry in Taiwan for increasing the use of renewable energy in generation 
portfolio and the phase-out of existing nuclear power plants. In response, the 
Nationalist (Kuomintang/KMT) administration initiated the ‘Millions Rooftop PVs’ 
and ‘Thousands On/Off Shore Wind Farms’ programmes, both of which commenced 
in March 2012. However, four and half years later, when there was a change of 
government, the accumulated installation of photovoltaics and wind power was 
merely 842MW and 647MW respectively, and renewable energy still only accounted 
for 2.3% of electricity generation in Taiwan. This unsatisfactory state of affairs was 
the result of a long contention between nuclear power and renewable energy, in 
which nuclear power was depicted as cheap, reliable and safe while renewable 
energy technologies were deemed technologically immature, expensive and not 
viable. At the same time, the idea of a perennial power shortage had the effect of 
instilling a deep fear in the public’s mind of the overwhelming consequences that 
power shortage can bring to the nation as a whole.  
Powering the nation with nuclear energy once was presented in policy discourse as 
the only reasonable and viable answer to this national predicament. The focus of 
democratic debates about energy politics moved from the open question of what a 
desirable common future might be, to a particular narrow framing of the problem. A 
singular, overwhelmingly supply-side focused approach, largely based on the 
imaginary of an unlimited and highly controllable energy source — nuclear energy — 
was tacitly inserted into the policy agenda and regarded by the government at the 
time as the only feasible way of solving this imminent power shortage. This difficult 
situation has to some extent been settled down after a series of actions by the anti-
nuclear movement and the subsequent mothballing of Nuclear Power Plant 4 (NPP4) 
in 2015. Although the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration which 
came into power in 2016 has been following a quite different direction in energy 
policy, nevertheless other aspects of how that energy policy is being done – such as 
the technically formed agenda of power shortage and the demonstration of public 
authority through public witness – remain largely remain unchanged. A puzzle 
remains: why does the tacitly attempted institutional knowledge–expertise in 
electricity planning routines retain its normative meaning and political strength?  
Drawing on the interpretative approach in science and technology studies (STS), we 
argue that in order to answer such questions there is a need to go beyond the web 
of factuality which constitutes an established order in economic and engineering 
issues, and instead to probe the meaning-making dimension of energy-production 
routines. In this paper, we explore the embroiled imaginaries in the contemporary 
sociotechnical energy system in Taiwan, shedding light on the legacy of post-war 
‘nationalist high modernism’ and the developmental state, which continue to 
influence today’s energy politics. Nationalist high modernism, as one of the 
prevailing imaginaries in post-war Asia, is shared by elite bureaucrats and 
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administrators in developing countries, where they make authoritative decisions 
over the ways to reach a particular version of the collectivist public good. This ‘will to 
develop’ (Chu 2011) keeps coming back in the forms of nationalist-pragmatist story-
lines and rationalities in the policy-making process and controversy regarding what 
the energy future ought to be; furthermore, this inherently autocratic imaginary 
which comprises an impoverished state-society relation does not simply fade away in 
recent waves of democratisation; on the contrary, it is maintained by deeply 
routinised practices in institutions and reinvigorated in arguments about technical 
viability and reasonableness. The reasonableness, and even desirability, of a 
particular energy future is enacted through the modalities of visualisation, discursive 
story-lines (Hajer 2006) and argumentative registers of technical necessity, all of 
which we aim to document and illustrate in the following sections.   
We rely on empirical materials which derive from interviews and content analyses of 
media reports and policy documents. Extensive documents are used to develop an 
analysis of the technical terms, frameworks and concepts used in Taiwanese energy 
debates between 2011 and 2015; key documents include Taipower’s Long-Term 
Power Development plan 2015, Electricity Terminology dictionary, and Measures to 
Power Rationing during the Period of Power Shortage, OFGEM’s Electricity Capacity 
Assessment report 2014, Royal Academy of Engineering’s report on GB Capacity 
Margins, and press releases from the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA). Four 
interviews were conducted with Taipower workers in the Departments of Power 
Dispatching, Research Institute, and Public Affairs, Power Development in order to 
understand how the actors in the field understand, interpret and practice these 
knowledges. Because of length restrictions, only some of the interviews are 
presented here. 
 
Sociotechnical Imaginaries and S&T as Meaning in-the-Making 
When we review the literature on science and technology policies and the post-war 
history of Taiwan, one clear common trope emerges: how can we catch up with 
Western countries? How can we develop further in economy, industry and society? 
How should we be modernised? The desire for development and the adoption of a 
‘latecomer’ identity profoundly shape knowledge interests in the Taiwanese 
humanities, social sciences academia and, more speciﬁcally, technology studies 
(Chen 2015). Certainly, this phenomenon is not limited to Taiwan; for example, in 
postcolonial South Korea, science and technology are exclusively associated with 
their role in rapid industrialisation and technological achievement (Kim 2015, 2013). 
In this context, aspirational imaginaries such as ‘being developmental’, ‘being 
modernised’ and ‘being progressive’ provide a common language shared by different 
factions in politics and divergent social groups; it is the indispensable premise for 
broad social negotiation and collective meaning-making in post-war Taiwan.  
5 
 
However, the conventional theory of modernisation attributes this great social 
transformation to the coming of rationality and technicality all around the globe, 
implying a linear and homogeneous development of society involving the 
institutionalisation of science and technology, and rapid industrialisation (Smith 
1983, Ichijo 2013, Scott 1998, Eisenstadt 2000). Rationalisation, especially in its 
embodiment in science and technology, is seen as the most fundamental driving 
force behind this global movement of conformity. Even more, science and 
technology, in this rationalist view, is considered as purely instrumental, objective 
and politically impartial. However, this over-simplified, misleading and teleological 
view of science and technology is problematised if we cast a critical eye on the 
diverging technological trajectories found around the world and the distinctive 
criteria of objectivity performed in one regime or another. Studies taking an 
alternative approach (Wynne 1996a, 1982, 2010, Wynne and Dressel 2001, Jasanoff 
1996, 2004, 2005, 2015, Hecht 1998, Porter 1995, Winner 1980, Eisenstadt 2000, 
Ichijo 2013, Scott 1998, Welsh and Wynne 2013) suggest that the role that science 
and technology plays in modernisation and policy-making is far from being apolitical, 
disinterested, and purely objective; on the contrary, science and technology is done 
materially, politically and culturally, and is done differently in different societies, 
cultures and polities.  
Hermeneutic dimensions of science and technology have been rather downplayed in 
STS (Jasanoff 2015, Welsh and Wynne 2013), and even anthropological work has 
tends to emphasise the epistemic dimensions of cultural difference relating to 
technoscientiﬁc initiatives. Therefore, an effort needs to be made to put social 
imaginaries and their enmeshed meanings, commitments and beliefs centre-stage as 
objects of analysis. Specifically, there is an urgent need to go beyond the surface of 
the strategy and science and technology policy deployed by actors, and ask how we 
can reveal the underlying visions of technoscience and social order that shape the 
actors’ very considerations, reasoning, and aspirations (Jasanoff and Kim 2009). It is 
such reasoning that lies behind our choice of an approach that focuses on social 
meaning-making rather than a more conventional interests-based rationalist 
interpretation of science and technology.  
We take a hermeneutic approach to science and technology, enlisting the concept of 
‘sociotechnical imaginaries’ as proposed by Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim 
(2009). Jasanoff and Kim use the term ‘sociotechnical imaginary’ to capture a 
particular gestalt of ‘less explicit, less issue-speciﬁc, less goal-directed, less politically 
accountable, and less instrumental’ but ‘pervasive meanings’ around science and 
technology (Jasanoff and Kim 2009, 123). These imaginaries are ‘collectively held and 
performed visions of desirable futures (or of resistance against the undesirable) … 
animated by shared understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable 
through, and supportive of, advances in science and technology’. Jasanoff and Kim go 
on to say that sociotechnical imaginaries ‘are collective, durable, and capable of 
being performed; yet … also temporally situated and culturally particular’ (Jasanoff 
2015, 19). They are representations of ‘factuality’ – of what is the case – but also 
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present what are seen as legitimate, moral and normative ways of ordering lives into 
forming realities. They are the co-produced, emerging from policy discourses, state 
administration and established institutions (Jasanoff 2004) and are backed up by 
technical routines and material infrastructures. Sociotechnical imaginaries are 
continuously and collectively negotiated meanings about what the realities now are 
and how the realities in the future ought to be (Jasanoff 2015, 4). 
Since science and technology are cultural and hermeneutic enterprises, especially as 
they are used in the process of policy-making, we should also notice that 
institutionalised practices and public reasoning in science and technology may 
seriously constrain the imagination of new forms of order and new ideas about how 
their social legitimation may be better founded (Wynne 1996a). The paramount 
characteristic of scientific knowledge in policy-making is its ostensible ability to 
establish facts and factual descriptions from the chaotic and ambiguous mundanity 
and its indispensable power to create social-political order in an apparently impartial 
way. However, the actual criteria of factuality, impartialness and objectivity, and the 
institutional culture that guarantees and performs them, vary between institution 
and institution, and between country and country, since the use of scientific 
knowledge in public reasoning always depends on unspoken commitments, promises 
and ambitions (Wynne 2014). 
As has been argued by Yaron Ezrahi (1990), the dichotomy between fact and fiction 
is a necessary ‘imagination’ in a modern democratic society founded on rational 
individualism. Science produces the knowledge of facts that informs the rational and 
voluntary choices made by actors. However, social actors’ values and goals are 
revealed to be often vague, relational, conflicting, unstable and open to negotiation 
(Welsh and Wynne 2013). Political performance and discourse, including technical 
assessment, bureaucratic planning, and scientific experiment, can guide people 
tacitly in certain ways, influencing what is regarded as reasonable, indispensable and 
desirable, or at least tolerable. Scientific knowledge in this sense is not only 
politically instrumental — irrelevant to meaning-making and being impartial — but 
also generative in conveying normative meanings and creating moral judgements 
(Wynne 1982, 2010, 1996a, b, 2011, 2014); it is a political practice that generates a 
particular form of understanding of effectiveness, objectivity, and trustworthiness.  
In focusing on the unspoken cultural dimension of science and technology in policy-
making, the aim is therefore to reveal the less obvious, more subtle and routinised 
practices, presumptions and commitments that are embedded as constitutive 
components in institutions and local cultures in the form of taken for granted 
habitual practices, identities, relationships, assumptions and beliefs (Wynne and 
Dressel 2001). Following this course, we propose an analytical tool: technopolitics in-
the-making. Drawing on both the concepts of ‘technopolitics’ (Hecht 1998) and ‘in-
the-making’ (Callon 1987), this concept help us to understand how the politics of 
artefacts (Winner 1980) are brought into action through technical choices and 
habituated expertise by both actors and materials. Technopolitics must be 
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understood as a continuous struggle to define who the actors in play are and how 
the system should work, both in technical and social-cultural terms (Hecht 1998). We 
add the term ‘in-the-making’ to signify that, even in circumstances where 
contestation is absent, the dominant sociotechnical imaginary and its modes of 
legitimation have to be continually reproduced through material and discursive 
practices.1  
Sociotechnical imaginaries certainly provide a powerful explanatory concept that we 
can use to critically explore technological development and especially state-
implemented scientific projects and policies; but they do not, by themselves, 
constitute the means through which decisions are shaped from day to day. Therefore 
we argue that culturally situated, less obvious, more subtle and routinised practices 
in institutions play an indispensable role in sustaining the particular relationships, 
identities and assumptions which sociotechnical imaginaries live upon. Imaginaries 
are not purely abstract and ideational, nor purely material, but a combination of the 
two. In the same way, technologies are not themselves technopolitics; rather, the 
practice of using technologies in political processes or in the service of political-
public authority (Hecht 1998, Wynne 2008) constitutes technopolitics. Technology 
cannot be reduced to politics. In short, we need the concept of technopolitics in-the-
making in order to understand the normative-cultural-material admixture of politics 
and science.   
 
Nationalist High Modernism and Depoliticisation 
Before entering our case of perennial power shortage, the relevant historical context 
needs to be described. To understand nationalist-pragmatist story-lines and their full 
significance, we need to trace their origins back to the Taiwanese history in the post-
war period and introduce the concept of high modernism. The island of Taiwan, or 
Formosa, was populated with aboriginal peoples until the early 17th Century, after 
which it saw centuries of immigration and colonisation, from the Dutch (1624–1662), 
the Spanish (1626–1642), the Cheng family (1662–1683), the Qing empire (1683–
1895), the Japanese (1895–1945), and the authoritarian Nationalist regime (1945–
1988) (Jacobs 2013, 2012). As suggested by Bruce Cumings, East Asian countries such 
                                                             
1 In this ‘anthropological-STS/SSK’ approach, we are interested in the practical forms of reasoning (or 
sense-making) among Taipower engineers, which have become an established culture by dint of 
internal repetition and collective reinforcement, with little or no significant contradiction or challenge. 
This is a different understanding of ‘rationality’ from a ‘scientific one’, where at least in public it is 
taken that the evidence which leads to that rationality’s particular propositional stance can be 
identified and clearly stated. This more cultural approach which we would take is far more difficult to 
cleanly document, precisely because of its historical nature, accumulating and gaining ‘natural’ 
authority and de-facto monopoly by repetition and reinforcement. Although the ‘creation (or design)’ 
of certain institutional habits, identities and relations is possible, an imaginary as a form of cultural 
asset does require a process of slow and often tacit accumulation. Conventions and routines are often 
performed unconsciously or, at least, inadvertently. Shared values, visions and aspirations (or fears) 
can be repeatedly enacted (or co-produced) through protocols, assessment schemes and technical 
choices along ingrained story-lines. Also see footnote 17.               
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as Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan are seen as successful models of the post-war 
developmental state and share similar strategy of development. Industrialisation is 
the ultimate goal of the state and the major approach to building a nationalistic 
economy; more importantly, this goal was made possible through the creation of a 
powerful and extensive bureaucracy and a centralised government (Cumings 1999).  
After the Republic of China (ROC) was founded in 1911, the Nationalist regime 
undertook coordinated efforts to institutionalise technoscientific development in 
China, for example by sending young students abroad to study industrially relevant 
subjects 實學 such as science, engineering, medicine and agriculture (Chang 2013) 
and establishing the National Economic Council 經濟委員會 (the predecessor of the 
MOEA), NEC, and the National Resources Commission 資源委員會, NRC (Greene 
2008). Many returning graduates later became the elite bureaucrats (as scholar-
officials) who led the high modernist statecraft of industrialisation of China and 
Taiwan. Technoscience 科技, engineering 工程 and modernisation 現代化 were 
perceived not only as the means but also part of the ends of the historical mission of 
‘nation-saving 救國’ (Chang 2013). During the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937 to 
1945, a pervasive sense of external threat led to a planned economy and a mighty 
state being seen as the most effective way to acquire rapid industrialisation and a 
strong nation. Industrialisation was deemed as a public asset (Chu 2007, Amsden 
2001). Chu argues in common with Dore (1990) that this ‘will to develop and 
modernise’ comes arose from a strong feeling of backwardness, even humiliation, 
sensed by the ruling elites and intellectuals concerning the international status of 
their nation (Chu 2011). Not surprisingly, the grand story-lines in China today are 
about how, starting in the mid-19th century, ‘China had suffered from foreign 
bullying, resisting foreign powers, and committed to striving for independence and 
prosperity’ (Hsiau 2013, 181). The ‘Century of National Humiliation 百年國恥’ is not 
only a recurring theme in both the pre-1949 Republican writings (in China) and the 
post-1949 Nationalist discourse (in Taiwan) but also the official view of modern 
Chinese history in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Hsiau 2013). 
In 1949, after being defeated in mainland China by the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) and fleeing to Taiwan, the Nationalist regime imposed martial law and adopted 
a bureaucratic authoritarian industrialising regime in Taiwan from the 1950s to the 
late 80s, making this the main ruling approach in post-war Taiwan (Cumings 1999). As 
argued by Wan-Wen Chu, the massive industrial estate left by the defeated Japanese 
colonial regime which was in Taiwan between 1895 and 1945, and the fact that these 
estates and factories were state-owned and operated from a centralised government 
under the supervision of Japanese Empire, created an easy-to-adopt premise for the 
Nationalist regime (Chu 2010) and their retreating elite bureaucrats. 
In the 1950s, the Korean War erupted. As part of the First Island Chain fighting 
against the expansion of the Communist party, the Nationalist regime received huge 
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U.S. aid. In the Korean War, Taiwan took the role of a logistical supply base; however, 
the Nationalist regime did not receive the full trust of the U.S. The operation of U.S. 
aid was deliberately segregated from other institutions in the regime and handed 
over to a group of engineers (Chang 2013)2. Engineers (as the majority of elite 
bureaucrats) became the surrogate of the authoritarian regime in Taiwan during this 
period (Kirby 1990, Chang 2013). In the Nationalist regime’s view, that engineers 
replace military generals as the direct channel to the U.S. government was also seen 
as benefiting the regime by diminishing the possibility of military mutiny (Chang 
2013). Within this historic context, engineers unexpectedly took the crucial but 
‘neutral’ role in Taiwanese politics.  
Nationalist high modernism is the dominant social and political trend in post-war 
East Asian countries such as South Korea (Kim 2015) and Taiwan, involving the belief 
that the modernisation of industry and the deployment of technoscience will ensure 
the expansion of the national economy and, therefore, the autonomy of the nation. 
In the nationalist modernists’ eyes, industrial, scientiﬁc, and technological 
developments would not only rebuild the nation’s economy after the destruction 
brought by wars but also restore the nation’s significance on the world stage (Chu 
2011). Furthermore, the clear aspiration to use science and technology to forge a 
new planned social order underlies the foundation of high modernism in many 
nation states during the 20th Century, such as the Japanese technical consultancy-
led ‘comprehensive development’ in Southeast Asia (Moore 2014), as argued by 
James Scott. High modernism is defined as ‘a strong, one might even say muscle-
bound, version of the self-confidence about scientific and technical progress, the 
expansion of production, the growing satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of 
nature (including human nature), and, above all, the rational design of social order 
commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws’ (Scott 1998, 4). 
Three tropes in high modernism need to be pointed out so as to illustrate the 
aspirational aspects of this prevailing sociotechnical imaginary in Taiwanese history. 
The first is the aspiration to administrate and order nature and society through the 
statecraft of measuring, standardisation, aggregation, and typification; in order for 
bureaucrats to comprehend messy reality, complexity must be reduced to ‘schematic 
categories’. This is to say, uniformity is highly preferred under statecraft. The 
invention of this statecraft and the deployment of abstraction illustrate an immense 
leap in state capability (Scott 1998). In Taiwan, the Nationalist regime inherited the 
rich legacy left by the colonial Japanese regime, including not only tangible assets but 
also intangible institutions such as the household registration system, land survey, 
population census, natural history research and the sophisticated mapping of natural 
and social terrain. Through fifty years (1895-1945) of governance under colonial 
Japanese regime, the key elements of high modernism had already been well-
established. This gave the elite bureaucrats of the Nationalist regime an excellent 
                                                             
2 The group at least includes 嚴家淦、尹仲容、楊繼增、李國鼎、俞國華、俞鴻鈞、徐伯園、蔣
夢麟、沈宗翰與孫運璿 (Chang 2013). 
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opportunity to fulfil the master plan of modernisation which had been interrupted in 
mainland China after 1949 (Chu 2007, 2011). 
Second, high modernism involves massive programmes of social engineering, carried 
out by the state but encouraged by progressive elites. High modernism, in this sense, 
is the extensive prescription of a new society in the future which will be brought 
about by realising a planned and intended blueprint. The dream of a utopia of 
egalitarianism and utilitarianism can be perceived clearly in post-war Taiwan. For 
instance, comparing the case of South Korea with Taiwan, Chu argues that the 
Nationalist regime in Taiwan achieved comparatively even wealth distribution by the 
principle of ‘雨露均霑 (roughly translated as ‘spreading rainfall evenly)’, enabling 
‘equal opportunity’ for state-own large enterprise, private large enterprise, and  
small and medium business, while in South Korea the state-privileged ‘Chaebol’ 
(family-run conglomerate) dominated the post-war development of capitalism 
through the policy of incubating ‘national champions’ (Chu 2011, 256-257, Wang and 
Tsai 2009, Wang 2007, Chu 2010). However, this state-planned economic 
egalitarianism in Taiwan should be considered as a form of state-monopoly 
capitalism. 
Finally, according to Scott, the third and most troubling feature of high modernism is 
its affinity with authoritarianism, which derives from its tendency to disallow other 
competing sources of judgement. Owning to its assumption that a radical break with 
existing reality and tradition is needed, it insists that traditions ought to be re-
examined and re-designed to fit the order informed by scientific and technological 
knowledge (Scott 1998). Echoed by the ‘saviour morality’ of nationalist bureaucratic 
elites, the key feature of high modernism in post-war Taiwan is thus the tendency to 
devalue wider political participation.  
As illustrated above, the predominant phenomenon that emerged from the historical 
context of the post-war authoritarian Nationalist regime (1945–1988) was the rise of 
engineers as the dominant fraction of elite bureaucrats. They prefer to be called 
‘technocrat 技術官僚’, but this does not mean that ‘technician’ is their primary 
identity; nonetheless, most of them came from an applied science background and 
received some forms of education from the U.S. (Chang 2013). The prevalence of 
nationally organised capitalism can be exemplified by the pursuit and study of 
national economy. National economy is considered as a branch of applied science 
and is often called as ‘經濟建設 (economic planning and development)’. Elite 
bureaucrats are not limited to persons who have applied science training, but their 
common trait is the experience of undertaking economic policy-making. As 
expressed by one of the most iconic figures, economist and politician Kwoh-Ting Li 李
國鼎: ‘people say the industrial committee only has engineers and no economists, but 
this is totally wrong ‘(Li quoted in Chang 2013). In fact the industrial committee took 
a pride in their expertise in economic planning and development.  
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Here, planned national economy does not only refer to macroeconomic policies such 
as monetary policy and financial market regulation but also to more ‘pragmatic’ 
topics such as the establishment of mining, refinery, steel, electricity, agriculture and 
military industries. For nationalist high modernists, these industries form the 
foundation of the national economy and productivity. Li once said, ‘I am from a 
science background, participating in economic planning, industrial development and 
financial decision-making’ (Li 1987). One distinctive example is that some elite 
bureaucrats have worked as the Head of Arsenal Department or the Chief Engineer 
of Taipower before taking office in the Ministry of Economy (Chu 2011, Chang 2013). 
These are not technicians who just work under political commands from above; their 
identity was bound up with an ethic of national service rather than a desire for proﬁt. 
These elite bureaucrats are state engineers (Porter 1995) who share a belief in 
pragmatic engineering. However, this does not mean that these elite bureaucrats 
are just a fig-leaf on an authoritarian regime. While the commands from high 
authority are definitely influential, the details in this nation-building project are too 
trivial to be contemplated directly by the regime leader. Detailed technical strategies 
and plans are left to the engineers to deal with (Tsai 2006). The integrated circuit 
development programme serves as a good example to illustrate this point: 
integrated circuit manufacturing was the strategic industry selected by these 
engineers to achieve national autonomy, despite disapproval from the scientists in 
the National Science Council (Tsai 2006).   
The expert bureaucrat’s technical rationality of developmental planning was used to 
depoliticise their tasks. Depoliticised economic planning is highly compatible with 
the operation of authoritarian government. The conciliation of authority and 
technicality is brought to reality through the efforts of engineers. The sense of 
depoliticised objectivity (Porter 1995) in the project of industrialisation and 
engineering comes from its technicality and pragmatism. On the one hand, 
transforming the moral term ‘national strength’ into a technical and pragmatically 
doable one provides these engineers with some protection against day-to-day court 
politics in the Nationalist regime (Chang 2013). For instance, Li argued that ‘we are 
not economists but engineers in action’ and that ‘economists may hold different 
opinions on issues but we, engineers, only try to deal with the real challenges facing 
us and try to solve them in pragmatic ways’ (Li quoted in Chang 2013). Another elite 
technocrat Chung-Jung Yin 尹仲容 similarly argued, ‘My basic point of view simply is 
how to do effective problem-solving in the real situation’ (Yin quoted in Chang 2013). 
On the other hand, national economic growth is depicted as the emblem of a 
maximised general utility — the pursuit of national productivity and competitiveness 
within the international market. This constructs an affinity between a clear, 
mathematical and economic figure – GDP (gross domestic product) – and a more 
abstract moral-normative concept – national strength.3 
                                                             
3 By naming nationalist high modernism the dominant sociotechnical imaginary in post-war Taiwan, 
we do not claim that the imaginary in Taiwan was homogeneous or deny that nationalist high 
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Indeed, the idea that solving problems merely with engineers’ eyes and hands in 
order to restrain invested political interests provides an excellent way to gain great 
vast public authority without much overt resistance. Depoliticisation and the appeal 
of sacrifice in service of the public-collective good constitute the very core of the 
nationalist-pragmatist story-lines which keep coming back and exerting influence in 
contemporary energy politics4. 
 
Perennial Power Shortage and the Obsession with Growth 
As discussed previously, the vision of a nationalistic and autonomous economy plays 
a pivotal role in high modernists’ eyes, and the question of how to build a 
powerhouse which secures technological development and an abundant power 
supply is at the centre of their agenda. Industrial policy, as the bastion of 
developmental state and, therefore, the manifest practice field for high modernists, 
is subjected to an intense gaze from the state. It was in this context that the 
Industrial Technology Research Institute 工業技術研究院 (ITRI) was established in 
1973 to facilitate a ‘coordinated and state-led developmental network’ (Wang and 
Tsai 2009). According to Chen (2012), ‘advanced technology’ is the key goal of ITRI 
engineers, even if this means that the products from their projects might lack market 
attractiveness. When it comes to the electricity sector of Taiwan, the Taiwan Power 
Company台電 (Taipower) is the dominant player. Based on the infrastructures built 
by the Japanese colonial government, Taipower has been the most powerful actor in 
the electricity sector since its establishment in 1946. It monopolises the power sector 
in its three key domains: generation, transmission and distribution. The monopolistic 
influence of Taipower registers not only in physical infrastructures such as 
transmission lines and transformers but also in institutional knowledge, expertise 
and ways of thinking in electricity planning.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
modernism was confronted by other challenging imaginaries. However, it is crucial to point out the 
dominant version of a sociotechnical imaginary can establish the perimeter of acceptable legitimacy. 
The key features of the high modernist imaginary we are illustrating here includes: the fear of lagging 
behind (latecomer), a mighty state, a belief in the prowess of science and technology, a ‘pragmatic’, 
depoliticised engineering, engineers with a saviour morality, a nationalist expanding economy and 
rapid industrialisation. 
4 Alongside the nationalist high modernism discussed here, an alternative imaginary can also be 
observed in the same period. This can basically be conceptualised as a native, land-oriented 
modernism and as a cultural and political reformism (Hsiau 2013), both of which can be traced back 
to the civil moments in the Japanese colonial era; this point will be advanced further in the conclusion 
section. Additionally, with the ongoing tide of democratisation in Taiwan since the late 1980s, the 
face of high modernism changed, while still remaining pervasive as a latent and common cultural and 
political resource. The impact of democratisation on nationalist high modernism can be further 
analysed in three dimensions: industrial policy, engineer’s identities and the forms taken by the 
democratic and civil movement in Taiwan. However, our aim here is not to provide a comprehensive 
diagnosis or to predict if there will be power shortages in the near future, but to highlight the legacy 
of high modernism in electricity planning and to provide a cultural explanatory insight to the technical 
choices made and practices done by the Taipower engineers in order to reveal their technopolitics.  
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The prominent figure amongst technocrats in the electricity sector is Yun-Suan Sun 
孫運璿. He is often hailed as the funding father both of Taipower and ITRI. As a 
member of the NRC in the Nationalist regime, he like many other elite engineers was 
sent to the U.S. Tennessee Valley Authority in order to gain experience of managing 
the electricity grid and power stations; when he came back in 1945 after the 
surrender of Imperial Japan, he took the central role in the takeover of the key public 
infrastructures left by the Japanese colonial regime in Taiwan, including the repair 
and further expansion of the Taiwanese electricity system. The repair of the 
transmission lines, hydropower dams and coal-fired stations were done not only by 
the group of mainlander elite engineers but also by engineers of Japanese, 
Taiwanese and other nationalities. However, Sun played the crucial role in guiding 
the transition of the original Japanese technical system to one with a strong 
American influence (Lin 2013). He was promoted as the Chief Engineer of Taipower in 
1950 and laid the foundation of power planning for the company. Being a key figure 
of the elite technocrats, he had an excellent chance to realise the high modernist 
dream of improving the nation through developmental planning and engineering as 
later he inaugurated as the Minister of the MOEA, the Energy Committee, the State-
Owned Enterprise Commission and finally the Premier of Executive Yu in 1978. The 
way that the high modernist imaginary links national strength, productivity and the 
ethos of state engineers can be exemplified vividly using his own words:  
‘The main purpose of accelerating economic modernisation is to 
strengthen the responding capacity of our economy, and another is to 
strive for the competitiveness of our agriculture, industry and 
commerce sectors in the international market. The primary means to 
achieve these ends is to increase our overall productivity … And the 
primary responsibility for increasing productivity should be borne by 
our engineers’ (Sun quoted in Chang 2013). 
In the following sections we will explore this cultural (meaning-making) dominance in 
an analysis of discourses, practices of public witnessing, and technical routines and 
choices. At the end of 2011, in the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, the 
Nationalist party’s Ma administration proposed a ‘New Energy Deal 新能源政策’ in 
response to the mounting demand from civil society calling for the termination of 
nuclear power plants and increased energy-saving. At the centre of this policy are 
three promises—no power rationing, a rationalised electricity price and fulfilling 
carbon-reduction commitments (Ministry of Economic Affairs 2012). The promise of 
‘no power rationing 不限電’’ is clearly prioritised in the policy actions. It was also 
argued that in order to avoid power rationing, nuclear power should be reserved as 
one of the possible options so that it is available for the next generation to choose. 
When we look back to the energy politics between 2011 and 2015 in Taiwan, 
probably the most recognisable feature is the perennial warnings of power shortage 
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issued by the government. The core story-lines of this episode can be briefly 
summarised in the following paraphrase:   
A higher and higher electricity demand pushed up by hot weather is 
inevitable. At the same time, renewable energy is still too immature to 
become a major player in generation. Given this situation, the 
termination of nuclear power plant 4 and the scheduled retirement of 
existing nuclear power plants would reduce the reserve margin to the 
level where there is a high risk of power rationing. When it is lower 
than 10% the chance is highly likely; when it is lower than 7.4%, it is 
inevitable. The impact that power shortages have on society, industry 
and economy is tremendous.  
While the assertions rely on questionable assumptions and no case of power 
rationing has been recorded since 2003,5 these are the story-lines widely shared by 
governmental actors such as Executive Yuan, the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(MOEA), the Bureau of Energy (BOE),6 the State-Owned Enterprise Commission and 
the Atomic Energy Council. According to Taipower’s Long-Term Power Development 
plan (10302), the reserve margins were predicted to drop to 9.8% in 2018 which is 
under 10%, the threshold of high risk of power rationing, and even to -0.3% in 2025 
(see figure 1). This forecasted ‘national predicament’, nonetheless, came with an 
imposed solution, the operation of NPP4. However, in contrast to the carefully 
displayed unanimity, the BOE’s 2014 report (Ministry of Economic Affairs 2014a), 
after being officially criticised by the Control Yuan (the governmental watchdog) in 
2012, tacitly provided a more optimistic prediction, indicating that the margins will 
soar up from 4.8% in 2019 to 14.2% in 2021. In our interviews, we also found that the 
power dispatching engineers may hold different opinions from their counterparts in 
the Department of Power Development on the issue of predicted negative reserve 
margins.  
File 1 
                                                             
5 The calculation of a ‘reasonable reserve margin 備用容量率’ is a key part of the nationalist-
pragmatist story-lines observed in the energy politics during this period of time. The statutory reserve 
margins decreased from 25% in 1983 to 15% in 2012. An ‘emergent power rationing’ was recorded at 
the latest incident happened in August 2017 due to an operation error attributed to the fuel provider 
CPC Corporation (Taiwan). Dissidence can also be found within Taipower, as implied by the 
interviewee D2: forecasting a negative margin is totally unacceptable; this is the power development 
plan which should be negotiated in the internal coordination meeting. 
6 The Bureau of Energy, BOE is an administrative body under the MOEA. Both of them are under the 




Fig. 1 － Reserve margins forecasted by Taipower, the ‘bleak future’ (Taipower 2014) 
 
In the following sections we look into the features of this particularly imagined 
sociotechnical future via the nationalist-pragmatist story-lines shared by 
governmental actors and the orchestrated practices of emphasising power shortage 
at present, and economic prosperity in the future－if the current risk of power 
shortage is solved in a feasible way. The story-lines exclusively emphasise supply-
side measures and put much less attention on demand-side dynamics7. Adding 
more capacity8  to generation was believed the most pragmatic, if not the only, 
method to solve the risk of power shortage. This combines an aspiration of nearly 
never-ending growth of GDP and electricity demand with a faith in pragmatist 
planning. It is continuously framed as a mission of pursuing the collective good as a 
state responsibility. It has to be established whether state has the will and ability to 
provide its population with a prosperous future.9 An endless supply of energy, in the 
nationalist-high modernist sense, is not only the means to an ever-growing economy 
but also symbolises the determination to achieve an ever-evolving society. 
                                                             
7 When facing the proposal of Zero Electricity Demand Growth advocated by activists in 2012, the 
BOE’s reply stressed the premise of a ‘persistent and favourable economic growth’ and a ‘pragmatic’ 
approach in terms of energy-saving and energy-efficiency. 
8 While more reserve margin does bring higher system reliability, it is not ‘the only way’ to ensure a 
sufficient supply. After all, the figure of reserve margins depends on multiple factors such as the 
frequency of unplanned generator outage (supply side) and the ability of accurate demand forecast 
(demand side). Official prediction of economic growth historically tends to be too optimistic. To 
predict a lower and even negative economic growth seems to be hard enough for the Nationalist 
administration to swallow. Additionally, the delays of overhaul schedules and unplanned outages can 
be left in ambiguity. The consequence is that a large and arguably wasteful reserve margin is 
‘required’. Also see footnotes 14 and 19. 
9 One of the Nationalist administration’s key political pledge is to ‘achieve a continuous annual 6% 
GDP growth and the goal of US$30000 GDP per capita. ‘Sufficient’ power provision and ‘no power 
rationing’ are their most concerns. 
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‘Electricity is the cornerstone of modern life and the driving force 
behind the industrial development of both traditional industry and 
emerging high-tech industry. In the past sixty years, Taipower has 
provided sufficient electricity for the need of developing people’s 
livelihood and economy. The transmission and distribution lines of 
Taipower have grown to every corner of Taiwan. Taipower lives with 23 
million fellow citizens every day’ (Taipower 2015a)10. 
A similar metaphor was used in the Chairman’s opening speech at the 70th 
Anniversary ceremony of Taipower: ‘for 70 years … the development of Taiwan’s 
industry and economy has taken off swiftly, riding on the wings of 
electricity’(Taipower 2016, 22). The same trope can also be found in 1940s and 50s 
USA: as Leslie White argued, ‘the degree of civilization of any epoch, people, or 
group of peoples, is measured by ability to utilize energy for human advancement or 
needs’ (quoted in (Nye 2010, 77). This view connotes a technological determinism, 
as if the ‘development’ of culture and society is correlated with economic growth 
and the consumption of energy. Additionally, in the cold war era, a limitless supply 
generated by atomic power was also imagined in the U.S. and infinite energy 
abundance was presented as the ‘natural’ and ‘developed’ condition, in contrast to 
the ‘undeveloped’ and ‘dark’ parts of the world (Nye 2010). 
Here, the presentation of a never-ending growth of economy and an ever-advancing 
development of people’s livelihood is a legacy of post-war high modernism and relies 
heavily on particular visualisations showing an apparently inherent relation between 




Fig. 2 — The relation between energy consumption and growth (Ministry of 
Economic Affairs 2014b, 6) 
                                                             
10  The promised state citizenship of electricity accessibility would create a new identity: the 
electricity-desiring citizen with the basic human right to electricity. Like the high-energy American way 
described by Nye (2010), electricity and its consumption gradually become an infrastructure of 






 Fig. 3 — The relation between energy consumption and growth (Ministry of 
Economic Affairs 2014a, 6) 
 
The statist gaze on the relation between electricity demand and GDP growth is not 
only underpinned by a vision of a ‘glorious past’ but also the schematic comparison 
with other countries. The period of negative growth of Taiwanese electricity demand 
in 2008 to 2010 (as shown in figure 3) is regarded as the consequence of negative 
economic growth which results from social unrest, the financial crisis, the European 
debt crisis and the Jasmine Revolution. In an official report written by the BOE, the 
U.K. and Demark were singled out as examples of lower or negative electricity 
demand growth and conceived as a departure from the ‘trajectory of economic 
growth’. It was argued that once the economies of these countries return to a 
trajectory of growth, the demand will go up again (Ministry of Economic Affairs 
2014a, 21, 24). 
However, the strong desire for continuous growth and development does not only 
involve imagining an affluent society in the future; it also constructs a current 
scarcity. Turning current scarcity into future affluence constitutes the main rhythm of 
nationalist-pragmatist story-lines. The manifestation of affluence in the future can 
only be secured by conquering the current imperfection constituted by impending 
power shortage – that is, by making a pragmatic and feasible technical choice. As we 
will demonstrate below, the use of nuclear power, as an incumbent source of 
generation, was repeatedly enacted as a mature and feasible technology to solve 
this scarcity. As suggested by Scott, high modernism often seeks to establish the 
reality of an undesirable current circumstance: here, it is imminent power shortage. 
Breaking apart from the unbearable current quagmire is always the rationale for 
sacrifice and great change. In order to do that, the message of power shortage needs 
to be convincingly demonstrated to the general public. The perennial warning of 
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power shortage in late summer and early autumn – the traditional peak season in 
Taiwan – has to be comprehended in this sense.  
We argue that this agenda is advanced implicitly through the arrangement of 
technical terminology. In order to understand how the claim of power shortage is 
formed and re-enacted on annual basis, we need to review the discursive practices as 
well as the institutional practices through which it gets reified and routinised. It is 
often assumed that in a subtropical country like Taiwan high temperature and 
electricity demand have an inseparable relation, even when the exact relation 
between temperature and demand is never fully explained. When mentioning high 
temperature, it is assumed that the consequence must be higher demand and 
therefore, increased risk of power shortage. This is a naturalistic construction of the 
problem because higher temperatures do not necessarily lead to power shortage 
and power disconnection thanks to the system-balancing measures to which 
electricity operators can resort. 
On the one hand, while the government’s discourses mostly refer to ‘power rationing 
限電’, the term ‘power shortage 缺電’, which implies ‘client disconnection 停電’, is a 
more salient term in public discourse. Even worse, the ambiguity between the terms 
‘power shortage’, ‘power rationing’ and ‘immediate power disconnection’ is 
exacerbated by their indiscriminate use in mass media either by reporters or officials. 
The different implications of the three terms do not get highlighted in the 
government’s discourse, which means that the questions of how long, how often and 
how likely the public will be disconnected are rarely clarified, leaving an inchoate fear 
of power disconnection pervasive in society. 
On the other, what have contributed to the firmly established alarming image of 
power shortage are the institutional practices of power rationing. One of these is the 
executive order11 ‘Measures to Power Rationing during the Period of Power Shortage 
電源不足時期限制用電辦法’. Under this order, power shortage is categorised into 
four different levels of action reacting to the levels of power shortage: temporary 
demand reduction measure 臨時性減少用電措施, other emergency reaction 
measures 其他緊急因應措施, industrial sector power rationing 限電 and planned 
power disconnection 停電 (Ministry of Economic Affairs 2006, Taipower Hsinchu 
Office 2015). In this executive order the legal term ‘power rationing’ is used strictly, 
referring only to the situation when all other possible mitigation measures including 
temporary demand-reduction measures and other emergency measures have been 
exhausted, and the industrial sector starts to receive capped power provision. 
However, Taipower has a different, managerial conceptualisation of ‘power rationing’ 
(see figure 4). In its information disclosure webpage and publicly accessible 
                                                             
11 An executive order does not need to be approved by the parliament, but is issued directly by the 
competent authority – in this case, the MOEA. 
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documents, emergent power rationing refers to the totally unexpected and 
accidental loss of system balance where demand exceeds supply, for example, due to 
the system damage resulted from an earthquake. In this situation, the responsible 
division is the electricity dispatching unit. Planned power rationing refers to the 
situation when the measures are expected to be implemented the day after the 
decision is made by the operations unit (Taipower Hsinchu Office 2015, Taipower 
2015e, b), and this would include all four levels of the action listed in the executive 
order. Importantly, the key question is whether voluntary measures of demand 
reduction and emergency reaction measures are regarded as part of the ordinary 
system-balancing measures available to operators in order to avoid power rationing 
(as according to the Executive Order) or as types of power rationing, and thus 
extraordinary, according to Taipower. This is the key point which generates ambiguity 




Fig. 4－Competing definitions of the key concept of ‘power rationing’ 
 
The current usage of the term ‘power rationing’ can be problematised. Industrial 
sector power rationing and planned power disconnection means that non-voluntary 
measures are imposed, while temporary demand reduction measures and other 
emergency reaction measures are simply options available to the operator to balance 
the system. The need of this clarification is due to the fact that the ‘system operator 
can use mitigation actions to manage supply shortfalls, with little or no impact on 
customers in most cases’ (OFGEM 2014, 23). More importantly, mitigation measures 
involve voluntary reductions or temporal displacement of demand. The electricity 
operator ‘can implement mitigation actions to solve capacity adequacy problems 
without disconnecting any customers’ (OFGEM 2014, 28). In other words, mitigation 
measures are the available means of balancing the grid which demonstrates the 
operator’s resilience.  
20 
 
On the demand side, electricity operators have the ability to manoeuvre peak 
demand by implementing demand-side management measures. On the supply side, 
the generators can be kept in operation during peak time by implementing a well-
performed work schedule of overhaul procedures. ‘Power shortage’ for electricity 
operators simply means the tightening buffer zone which can be used to undertake 
system balancing; it does not necessarily mean that the ultimate measure of client 
disconnection must be done immediately so as to protect the system (OFGEM 2014). 
However, this point was not clarified by Taipower or the MOEA until 2017. 
Although the press release from the MOEA stressed that some forms of demand-
reduction and mitigation measures would be implemented first before adopting 
more serious actions (Ministry of Economic Affairs 2015) 12 , these mitigation 
measures are still often referred to as ‘power rationing measures’. The ambiguity 
created here has political strength, especially when it comes to the asserted 
commitment to ‘no power rationing’ pledged by the Nationalist administration, and 
the MOEA’s clear preference for solving this predicament by adding more generation 
capacity through the construction and operation of the NPP4. For the engineers in 
the dispatching room, this ambiguity is created when a technical term travels from 
the dispatching room to the planners’ office and thence to the public.  
Load restriction is the technical terminology of power rationing … the outside 
word probably won’t tell the difference between emergent load restriction 
and planned load restriction. For them, they are both called as power 
rationing. It is hard to ask the outsiders to share our perspectives, the 
perspectives of engineers. (Interviewee D2, 25/01/2016) 
The term ‘power rationing’ has strong political implications. Consciously or 
unconsciously, actively or passively, the bureaucratic planners bridging the two 
groups — the dispatching engineers and the public — fail to highlight the different 
concerns embroiled in the different terms (see figure 5).13 
 
File 5 
                                                             
12 ‘After implementing power rationing measures, 1100, 000kW peak demand can be curbed, this can 
add 3% more operating reserves to the system’ (Ministry of Economic Affairs 2015). Here the power 
rationing measures include ‘temporary demand reduction measures (mitigation measures)’. 
13 As we argued clearly, by treating science and technology as a cultural enterprise means we are not 
seeking the creator or the instructor of a sociotechnical culture. A culture is accumulated across time 
and (re)performed by numerous actors and materials, consciously or inadvertently, who may have 
different interests. However, we do think that the planners who have an engineering background and 
are at the position of bridging the two different concerns possess the key power of – implicitly or 




Fig. 5 — Different concerns among groups of actors 
As we noted above, nationalist-high modernism as the dominant sociotechnical 
imaginary in the Taiwanese electricity sector can influence what is regarded as an 
accepted value, what is reasonable, and what is relevant — what is ‘the rationality’ 
that we ought to follow. In this sense, it is inherently normative in its prioritisation of 
adding more generation capacity to meet the nation’s need and of declaring power 
shortage, instead of reinforcing the measures of demand-side response and 
mitigation. This is an implicit attempt to define what is salient and to be prioritised in 
energy politics in Taiwan. Now, any attempt to curb and manoeuvre power demand is 
framed as the declaration of power shortage, the most fearful and stressful scenario 
in the national predicament. 
 
Making It Observable: The Public Witnessing of Operating Reserves 
Being able to be observed is another crucial element of the nationalist-pragmatist 
story-lines. The obsessive concern with the idea of power shortage in the nationalist-
pragmatist story-lines is also reinforced by the creation of observable indicators and 
objective figures — operating reserves 備轉容量. When society transforms from an 
autocratic regime to a liberal-democratic government, the condition of the power 
supply should be directly witnessed by the public. Citizens, after all, are the primary 
targets for whom state enacts its scientiﬁc and technological demonstrations.  
The inherent rule laid down by liberal-democratic politics is the possibility of knowing 
other people and of understanding and judging their actions, which requires the 
belief that true representation is achievable and that political agents can be held 
accountable by the public. ‘This faith has been upheld in the liberal-democratic 
tradition by an optimistic political epistemology, according to which politics consists 
of actions or events that are observable and reportable as public facts’ (Ezrahi 1990, 
67). Technical-instrumental terms are constructed with the aim of externalising and 
objectifying political actions in the visual space of publicly perceived facts (Ezrahi 
1990). In this respect, the observable indicator of operating reserves presents an 
instrumental, immediate, real-time situation of national power provision. Operating 
reserve is the meter reading which can be obtained from the dispatcher’s control 
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panel. Compared to the probabilistic index such as LOLE (Loss of Load Expectation, 
e.g. x hours in 1 year), it is, in the words of one of Taipower’s dispatchers, more ‘real 
and concrete’ (Cheng 2011). Operating reserves shows in real-time how much kW or 
capacity (%) can be used for balancing purposes. 
 
File 6 and 8 
 
Fig. 6－The ‘Precautionary Light Signal of Power Provision’(Taipower 2015d) 
 
The idea is that the real situation should be visible to the general public. The figures 
showing how much operating reserve is available in real time were put online 
because of public pressure. This information was regarded as internal data and was 
not released to the public (Cheng 2011) until 2013. One year after its release, the 
indicator scheme was online. This is the indicator scheme called ‘the Precautionary 
Light Signal of Power Provision 電力供應預警燈號’’. After a series of ‘warnings’ of 
power shortage observed in June 2015, the classification was expanded even further 
(see figure 6). It was stated that when the operating reserve is under 500,000kW, 
then ‘industrial sector power rationing’ will be initiated. It was said that the 
expansion is to urge the public to ‘make sacrifices on the basis of understanding and 




Although the indicator scheme of operating reserves represents as ‘matters of fact’ 
how much capacity is left for dispatching, it fails to capture the complexity of the 
‘matters of concern’ (Latour 2005) entangled in the institutionalised practices 
performed by Taipower. The meaning and diagnosis of every signal are not as static 
and mechanically rigid as the indicator scheme suggests. As suggested by 
interviewees W8 and D2: 
I guess [the handling of] operating reserve largely depends on dispatchers’ 
experience. So there isn’t a rigid quantitative mechanism behind the 
handing - it is decided by the conclusion of their internal meetings. Through 
the interaction with the dispatching office, I gradually realised that there 
are no fancy quantitative models like I assumed. Lots of things are based on 
their rule of thumb. (Interviewee W8, 28/01/2016) 
 
Power rationing often results from the unplanned outage of high capacity                   
generators … this is why the dispatching unit needs to, in convention, 
prepare at least the equivalent operating capacity of the highest capacity 
generator [in the system] to react to the emergency situation. This can also 
be half the capacity of the highest capacity generator. The more operating 
reserve, the more provision stability – but it also means no economic 
efficiency … in the isolated electricity grid like Taiwan, dispatchers 
[naturally] want more operating reserve … I think this indicator scheme is 
invented on the basis of [the current dispatchers’] experience. In my 
opinion, it [the diagnosis of signals presented here] is slightly conservative. 
(Interviewee D2, 25/01/2016)  
 
The launching of the indicator scheme should be understood as an effort to make 
engineer’s managerial figures into public facts through collective witness (Shapin and 
Schaffer 1985), while denying the need to examine  the technical conventions that lie 
behind them. Through the collective witness of objective figures, the flexibility of the 
interpretation of operating reserves is diminished to an extent that the relevant 
experience and context is deleted and made into static rules. Power shortage as a 
political metaphor comprises a social amplification of what happens on the 
engineer’s control panel; suddenly the meter reading of operating reserves becomes 
the most nerve-wracking fact for the whole nation. 
 
Habituated Expertise in Electricity Planning: Net Peaking Factors 
Over the years, the calculation of reserve margins 備用容量 and operating reserves 
備轉容量 has come to dominate the public debate over electricity. The ‘proper 
understanding’ of these two concepts is considered by different factions to be the 
crucial, if not the only, eligibility to take part in the debate. To an extent, they are 
seen as the only sensible way to discuss power shortage and electricity provision. 
Taipower has always argued that the concept of reserve margins is the most 
important factor that can be used to evaluate the stability of provision in electricity 
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planning. Before going on, a short comparison between operating reserves and 
reserve margins can be helpful to exploring further the intricacy in Taipower’s 
electricity planning. The term of ‘reserve margins’ is mainly used for long-term 
planning of system capacity, whereas the concept of ‘operating reserves’ is used for 
measuring system resilience during day-to-day operation. They can both be 
represented as14: 
 
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 (𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀) 
 
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ×  100 (𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑 %) 
 
The main difference between reserve margin and operating reserve can be 
summarised as below (Taipower 2015c, d, Prada 1999) (see also figure 7): 
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14 Mindful readers may have noticed that exactly the same equation is used for both reserve margins 
and operating reserves. This may result from Taipower’s high modernist belief in making ‘factual 
certainty’ that we are going to discuss at the end of this paper. This peculiar situation indeed raises a 
deep question: how does one make sense at all of the difference between reserve margin (as a matter 
of the planned) and operating reserve (as a matter of fact), which is unrecognised uncertainties such 
as unplanneds outage and delayed overhauls? We believe the answer is surprisingly simple: they are 




Fig. 7－The breakdown and comparison of reserve margins and operating reserve.  
 
Both reserve margin and operating reserve are predicted figures; however, they are 
based on very different time scales. The ‘reserve margin’ is the estimated available 
extra capacity over one year, therefore is an estimated figure which does not take 
account of any reductions due to annual repair, temporary repair, unplanned outage 
and other factors which interfere with the maximum power production of the total 
installed capacity. In contrast, ‘operating reserve’ means the (also estimated) 
available capacity on a specific day, which takes account of ‘recognised factors’ in 
that day such as annual repair, temporary repair, unplanned outage and other 
factors, which are therefore itemised separately. Furthermore, Taipower’s definition 
of the total availability in the calculation of reserve margins is regarded as ‘net 
peaking capacity in planning’ which is defined as: the nameplate capacity ×  net peaking factor 
 
Net Peaking Factor (NPF) is a factor specific to different power generation 
technologies, decided by the Taipower on the basis of certain assumed conditions. 
For gas or coal plants, it is (Taipower 2015b): 
𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐  
For the hydro plants, it is: (the maximum output with the water level in the dry season)




For renewable energy technologies such as solar, wind and biomass, which are 
technologies that are comparatively new to Taipower, the NPFs are simply ‘set’ as 




Table 1 － the values of NPFs 
NPFs are probably calculated not on the current actual output, but simply by 
assuming the ‘right figures’ — figures which are habituated in Taipower’s 
institutional practices, and are not regularly reviewed and checked. Interviewee D2 
recognises the inadequacy of the operating experience of renewable energy in 
Taipower, which contributes to the lack of checking and correcting the NPFs of 
renewable energy:  
Taipower currently has inadequate actual records of renewable energy 
generation. The accumulation of data is not enough; neither is the 
coverage of data. They [The net peaking factors of renewables] should be 
revised accordingly in the future. As for the operating reserve forecasted by 
the dispatching unit … it can always be forecasted on the basis of the recent 
actual generation results and the last year results. It [the forecast] should 
not be as conservative as it is in the power development unit. (Interviewee 
D2, 25/01/2016) 
 
The NPFs of the renewable are habituated expertise in Taipower’s electricity planning 
and treated as the ‘figures of consensuses’, to be used instead of figures that would 
reflect the latest actual results of the newly constructed renewable installations. Yet 
they are used as facts in the internal discussion:  
 
These figures are used to discuss the impact that the installation of the 
renewable would bring to the national grid during an internal conference. 
The dispatcher referred to these figures to perceive the possible instability 
renewables bring when they are connected to the grid — can they support 
                                                             
15 According to American National Renewable Energy Laboratory, the value for PV should be in the 
range of 50%-80%. For wind power, it is 25% according to the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory – 
similar to the figure of 17%-24% given by the Royal Engineering Academy. 
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the huge demand in Taiwan? … These figures are the consensus in the 
group of people who engage in energy development. I visited the Institute 
of Nuclear Power Research – they also use these figures. (Interviewee W8, 
28/01/2016) 
 
Interviewee W8 later told us that these NPFs are understood as ‘the average 
performance benchmark of a particular technology (Interviewee W8, 28/01/2016)’. It 
would not be challenged until a ‘new technology’ or a ‘new generation’ of a 
technology emerges. This implies that these figures are seen as not needing to be 
checked and reviewed against the latest actual generation results. This thought is 
echoed by the reply we received from the Power Development Office: 
 
It [net peaking capacity] is used for the purpose of calculating reserve 
margin and future power development … the particular output of a 
renewable installation (solar or the wind) is influenced by the local weather 
conditions on that day, and therefore, the actual output/nameplate 
capacity ratio of the same type of renewable energy installations [in 
different places] on the same day would not be identical. The net peaking 
capacities of the solar and the wind power are calculated on the basis of 
the national average of output, not on the particular installation.  
(Interviewee P1, 28/01/2016) 
 
This argument implies that, although renewables can vary greatly in their outputs, 
when they are included in the calculation of reserve margins, their contributing 
capacity is deemed a static – and low – figure. For the purpose of power 
development, these variations and irregularities need to be simplified to the extent 
that they do not affect the validity of the planning system. Precisely because of their 
outputs can fluctuate hugely depending on where and when they are generating, a 
rigorous and up-to-date figure is needed to reflect their flexibility and possible 
contribution during peak times and seasons. Despite this being known, planning 
processes still mostly follow the convention and consensus, and deem this flexibility 
irrelevant. The anchored expertise and planning culture can seriously restrict the 
emergence of the new forms of planning order and of new ideas about how their 
conceptualisation may be better founded to accommodate the transformation of the 
generation system. In fact, Taipower does have a definition on how to define a NPF of 
renewable energy calculated on the basis of actual generation results. According to 
the definition, for solar power, it is as follows (Taipower 2015f, 2-4): 
 Base on the output recorded from 10 hours to 17 hours  every day in a year, the maximum power a generator  can supply during this specific period for at least 85% of  the time is defined as its net peaking capacity, that is,    about 20% of the nameplate capacity  




Base on the output recorded every day in a year,  the maximum power a generator can supply during this  specific period for at least 85% of the time is  defined as its net peaking capacity, that is, about 6% of the nameplate capacity 
 
Two key implications need to be highlighted in terms of the technical choice made by 
Taipower here: the first, the standard of ‘the capacity available in the 85% of the 
time’ is the one can be considered as strict, especially for intermittent generation 
technologies like renewables. According to a report commissioned by Taipower in 
1996, this is a standard originally designed for coal-fired technology because it can 
always produce stable output all the time in a year. Under this standard, the 
contribution of renewables to the total net peaking capacity (the total availability in 
reserve margin calculation) is significantly underestimated, and therefore, the 
standard should be set as the capacity available in the 50% of the time, instead of, 
85% of the time in order to avoid the ‘zero contribution’ scenario of solar power 
(Wang 1996). Taipower since has made a revision to the definition; however, the 85% 
standard originating from the incumbent coal-fired generation is proving to be a 
convention too firmly rooted in institutional practice to be easily changed.  
 
The second and most important reason to calculate ‘net peaking capacity for 
planning (the total availability/supply)’ is to examine whether during peak time the 
supply can meet the demand. While taking account of the whole output record for a 
year is quite sensible for the incumbent generation technologies like nuclear, coal-
fired, and gas-fired power because they can always produce stable output, this rule 
becomes problematic for renewables — it may be seen as discrimination against 
renewable energy16. The output of the renewable can fluctuate quite remarkably 
depending on weather conditions, meaning that the weather patterns in different 
seasons are a crucial factor that is should not be neglected. Summer and early 
autumn are the traditional peak time in Taiwan energy use, due to the wide use of 
air-conditioning, and photovoltaics, fortunately, can produce much higher output at 
this time than in winter. In this scenario, the renewable is not meant to replace ‘base 
load’ generation, but to help meet peak demand during the year. 
 
To summarise this section, NPFs have their politics and are a concentrated form of 
implicit social meaning-making: correct knowledge makes normativity. Presented as 
facts grounded in consensus and objectivity, they are enacted as measures of the 
inherent technical capacity of generation technologies, a part of habituated technical 
know-how, the ‘correct’ understanding of which is a qualification for engaging in 
debates about electricity planning17 . 
                                                             
16 According to the British government’s Electricity Market Reform Delivery plan, in the calculation of 
de-rated margin, it only takes account of the output records of the peak season, that is, the winter 
season in the U.K.  
17 Habituated know-how, expertise (e.g. NPFs) and the deemed legitimate technical qualifications are 
all constitutive components of what Thomas P. Hughes calls ‘technological momentum’. However, as 




Ordering the Future: The Creation of Factual Certainty 
While the concept of reserve margins is so established in the debate that it is treated 
as a common language crossing different competing factions, the question attached 
to it, ‘is it a reasonable and sufficient reserve margin?’, produces no fertile outcome 
and fails to generate a reflection on the presumed rationality in current electricity 
planning. A comparison between reserve margins and its British counterpart, de-
rated margins, can bring out the different rationalities that are enmeshed in the 
technicality of electricity planning in the two countries. In the British electricity 
industry, the total availability when calculating reserve margins is clearly treated as a 
rough, imprecise and hypothetical figure, as it only shows the designed capacity in an 
ideal environment such as a laboratory. As explained by the Royal Academy of 
Engineering, ‘traditionally, total available capacity was taken as the sum of full 
theoretical or nameplate capacities of all plant on the system’ (Royal Academy of 
Engineering 2013, 9). The definition stresses its ‘gross’ attribution of listed capacity, 
therefore, it can also be called as ‘gross capacity’ (Royal Academy of Engineering 
2013). This total availability registers an ideal situation which indicates the desirable 
future the electricity development planners are aiming for; however, it is also marked 
clearly as an indicative target for own institutional purposes.18  
However, for Taipower, the use of reserve margins is, without a doubt, more than a 
purely hypothetical and indicative figure. It is the figure used in planning an energy 
future for the whole nation, a part of statecraft which simplifies or even ignores 
uncertainty such as unplanned outages and delayed overhauls, as they are not 
itemised separately. It is not hard to comprehend why Taipower’s conceptualisation 
of reserve margins relies heavily on making factual certainty. In order for Taipower 
engineers to comprehend the more-than-complicated indeterminacy of both supply 
and demand sides and fulfil their collectivist responsibility, indeterminacy must be 
reduced to certainty. In this sense, adding more capacity, even more than the 
recognised unavailability,19 is the most pragmatic way to secure ‘sufficient’ provision 
and a potent national economy. Factual certainty is required and used in public 
                                                                                                                                                                              
having been ‘passed through peers without facing challenges’ rather than being created for a 
particular purpose. If we trace back to the point when this scheme of margins was created, we may 
find that its creation is a part of ‘(pragmatic) problem-solving’ engineers do on daily basis which bears 
no clear wider intention. We argue this is exactly how technopolitics are in-the-making and may 
reflect a distinctive feature of technopolitics, which it is not necessarily done with a clear self-
explanation.   
18 ‘In the past, the CEGB would typically have planned the system on the basis of maintaining a 20% 
gross capacity margin’ (Royal Academy of Engineering 2013, 9). Regarding the forecasted margins, 
such as in OFGEM’s report, they are treated as highly constructed scenarios and therefore, indicative 
and suggestive futures (OFGEM 2014). This point is clearly stated in the report. 
19 The idea of a buffer zone (the reserve margins) is quite common and understandable. However, if 
the operator always expects unplanned outages and delayed overhauls, and does not seek the 
reasons why they happen and where possible reduce them, then a huge buffer zone would be indeed 
‘required’. Also see footnotes 8 and 14. 
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persuasion, which thus demands authoritative commitment in public authority. 
Uncertainty has to be ruled out. The hypothesis on the engineers’ paper needs to 
become established reality.  
Last but not least, while in the British electricity industry the obsolescence of reserve 
margins is gradually recognised due to the rising contribution of renewable energy in 
the generation system,20 Taipower has no intention to follow suit. For them, the 
incumbent generation technologies such as nuclear, coal-fired and gas-fired can 
provide high controllable availability for planning tasks, while the renewables give no 
clear guarantee on how much capacity can be assured as available. Judged by the 
standard of proving controllable availability and stability, the renewables are seen as 
truly ‘immature’ as they can merely provide as low as 6% availability in wind power 
when traditional generation technology can provide as high as 97.8%-94%. The 
entrenched planning practices originating from the incumbent generation 
technologies keep enacting the renewables as ‘immature’ technology. The 
characteristics of intermittent generation of renewable technologies bring a huge 
challenge to institutionalised convention, and therefore to Taipower’s planners. The 
lack of controllable availability and stability of renewable energy perceived by the 
Taipower engineers creates huge irregularity for their high modernist statecraft. The 
so-called ‘immaturity’ of renewable energy does indeed reveal the ‘incompatibility’ of 
renewables with the incumbent planning conventions21. The habituated expertise of 
incumbent generation technology which emerged from Taiwan’s authoritative and 
high modernist past is hindering the light-of-sight to a new energy system.  
 
Conclusion: The Rationality of Authoritarian Developmental Planning 
and Beyond 
The nationalist high modernist commitment to a better future for the whole nation 
and society constitutes the backbone of the nationalist-high modernist story-lines in 
Taiwanese energy politics. The technical choices involved in putting exclusive 
emphasis on supply-side measures and much less attention on demand-side 
dynamics, the intensified public testimony of operating reserves and the obvious 
                                                             
20 De-rated capacity/margin is a concept enjoying increasing preference and replacing reserve 
margins as the main concept of electricity planning task in the U.K. The preference for de-rated 
margins comes from the growing contribution made by the renewable in the generation system, 
which makes the concept of reserve margin obsolescent. Under this concept, the nameplate capacity 
is de-rated by ‘a factor which reflects the statistically expected level of reliable availability from that 
plant type during a given season’ (Royal Academy of Engineering 2013, 9). This gives the renewable 
and traditional generation technologies equal footing, as the available capacity of both technologies 
are now equally evaluated through historical records of availability in the peak season. 
21 Drawing on the experience of the British electricity industry, it is possible to treat renewable energy 
as a stable source of provision. The emergence of the concept of ‘equivalent firm capacity (EFC)’ of 




preference for creating factual certainty can only be comprehended through taking 
the larger historical-cultural and institutional context into account. We would argue 
that in Taipower’s imaginary, the engineers, as pragmatic doers and foresighted 
planners, are expected to orchestrate materials and social order to validate their 
blueprint for society and public authority — a prosperous energy future is prescribed 
by Taipower’s engineers, and society should follow the prescribed path to it. This is 
the underlying vision of developmental planning which was born in the post-war era 
when an authoritarian state-society relationship was firmly in place. This involves a 
rationality of authoritarian developmental planning, the tendency to merge broad 
and rich social meanings into a simplified logic of planning, with the effect of 
reinforcing the unstated authoritarian commitment and suppressing alternatives. 
Although Taiwanese politics and society are largely liberalised and democratised 
since the lifting of martial law in 1988 after a 38-year long of ‘White Terror’, and 
despite the fact that policy discourses can shift rather quickly following a democratic 
election and the ensuring change of government, we believe these technically 
formed agendas and institutionalised practices do not change overnight22; they are 
where a specific sociotechnical imaginary gains its durability.  
The fertile social and environmental movements since the 70s have paved the way 
and provided momentum for democratisation and the shake-up of the nationalist-
high modernist imaginary. The people no longer act as a passive audience of the 
demonstration of high modernist statecraft; instead, the people started to actively 
express their feelings, claiming ‘body sovereignty’ and social legitimacy, and on the 
basis of these asserting their political and legal rights (Lii and Lin 2000, 2003). This 
alternative imaginary focuses on local issues, native soils 鄉土-attached memory and 
directly voiced concerns (Lii and Lin 2000, 2003, Hsiau 2005, 2010, Wu and Lii 2005, 
Ho and Lin 2011). In this very different dreamscape of modernity, the people are 
imbued with memories, emotions and local experiences. For them, modernity 
requires participatory democracy (Lii 2009). Following this trajectory, the anti-nuclear 
(NPP4) movement initiated in 1988 certainly played an indispensable role in 
redefining nuclear power as a hybrid of U.S. hegemony, Nationalist autocracy and 
technocracy, and at the same time foregrounding the DPP as the vanguard of political 
reform (Tsui 2011). 
                                                             
22 Through the long history of the anti-NPP4 movement, Taipower came under serious criticism from 
several ‘outsider’ experts, such as 陳謨星 (IEEE Fellow, a doctor of Electrical Engineering), 賀立維 (a 
doctor of Nuclear Engineering) and 彭明輝 (a doctor of Control Engineering) for its electricity 
planning decisions; however, these criticisms were rejected and deemed as fallacious by Taipower 
and had only minimal impact. The Chinese Institute of Engineers (Taiwan) mostly stayed outside the 
debate while dismissing public fears of nuclear power as based on ignorance. This illustrates how 
Taipower’s planning decisions and practices are majorly sheltered from critique. Despite many 
changes being made to the Electricity Act in 2016, since which the prediction of reserve margins is not 
announced to the public and the procedure of power rationing has been explained thoroughly by the 
MOEA in the latest development in August 2017, this does not mean that the whole regime of 
incumbent power development has been examined and reformed. 
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Notwithstanding, since the beginning of the 1990s, this imaginary (that we 
tentatively call a ‘indigenist-reformist rationality’) was, bit by bit, transformed by the 
expansion of the expertise-based advisory scheme (Lii and Lin 2003, Ho 2003), losing 
its grassroots vitality (Tsui 2011). The most broadly documented case is the scheme 
of the Environmental Impact Assessment; consciously or inadvertently, it operates as 
a very practical (often developmental) problem-solving process23 dominated by 
experts, who are seen as having been a ‘virtual commission’ by the public to give 
advice to the government. The EIA demonstrates the tendency of ‘solving expertise 
problems by bring in even more expertise’ (Tang and Chiu 2010, Tu 2012). A 
developmental Leviathan, as obscure as it may be, still hovers over the 
institutionalised conventions and habituated expertise of Taiwanese society. With the 
new wave of civil movements surging from the late 2000s, and the milestones of the 
2014 Sunflower Movement, the NPP4 mothballed in 2015, and the new initiatives of 
renewable energy usage and installation (Chiu 2014, Yang 2015), how can we, STS 
researchers, help society go further by scrutinising the admixture of the rationality of 
developmental planning, expertise and technopolitics? 
The role of knowledge and expertise in policy-making should not be simply seen as 
unproblematic or obvious. It should be considered as a situated cultural enterprise 
which expresses values, preferences and beliefs in the forms of both policy 
discourses and material arrangements. Clearly, the ways of doing electricity planning 
we investigated here are far from being, as is claimed, purely instrumental and 
unpolitical; the power of technopolitics can only be understood and fully explored 
when we take the larger historical-cultural and institutional context into account and 
shift our research focus from identifying interests to revealing the dominant and 
often hegemonic imaginary. It has been a key element of our account that 
‘democratic participation’ in modernising Taiwan of the late 20th/early 21st 
Centuries remains under-articulated and emergent.24 However, we also suggest that 
this case-study, of political contestation over imagined energy futures for Taiwan, and 
over their corresponding imaginaries of Taiwan’s social-political future, is one of the 
main historical vehicles for whatever form(s) a more democratically developed 
Taiwan will take. When we consider the issue of how experts of the kind we have 
described in the Taiwanese energy case imagine their publics, an issue with a 
growing literature in Western societies (Rommetveit and Wynne 2017), the 
conclusion has to be that ‘the public’ which the powerful expert culture has imagined 
or recognised is weakly articulated. The changes since the new government was 
voted in in 2016 appear to reflect an imaginary of a public which is able to respond 
to a more flexible and less centrally managed energy system, and one which does not 
require the supposed security of a paternalistic nuclear techno-political culture.  
                                                             
23 In a liberal democracy, when encountering more and more critiques, the instinct of high modernists 
is often to intensify their high modernity, deploying yet more mathematical equations and formulas. 
The renewable energy’s FITs committee is a good example.    
24 This is not to assume any teleological dynamic of inevitable progress towards a democratic ideal in 
the absence of effective countervailing factors.  
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Finally, developmental high modernism in East Asia is characterised by the 
authoritarian reflex of planning rationality, which is by definition monolithic and thus 
with no imaginary of complex multiplicity. This rationality gives paramount political 
weight to a particular imaginary of a collectivist public good which is crafted through 
performative technicality in constructing the impartiality and objectivity of public 
authority. All of this posits a critical question: how can we disagree with the salient 
call for public welfare found in such statist technoscientific programmes and 
authoritative past, while still agreeing that the ‘public good’ as the underlying 
generic imaginary in democratic society is still very relevant for guiding the ways in 
which technologies are imagined and materially enacted? The interpretation of the 
concerns and ontologies which we have attempted to do in this case of energy in 
Taiwan and their articulation and material enactment in public processes could be a 
next step for future research; however, as yet, public mobilisation in this case 
remains weak, and thus the public issue itself remains to be more fully articulated. At 
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